Saturday, April 28, 2007

Response to GIMJ re: Necessity

Godismyjudge (GIMJ) wrote:

Dear Turretinfan,Your article speaks of three different types of necessity (logical, De Jure & De Facto) none of which restrict us from choosing as we please. You yourself point out that "Logical Necessity does not - itself - place any attempted restriction on action." De Jure Necessity does not mean that man cannot commit what is forbidden, but rather he cannot do what is forbidden without guilt. So De Jure Necessity adds an extrinsic aspect to our actions. I trust you see that De Jure Necessity is not a limitation in what we can do.Man is free from De Facto Necessity (freedom from external force/compulsion). To clarify this is doing something against our will. The man wants to do X but is forced to do Y. This should not be confused with someone or something external to us is controlling what we want. If we are free in this sense, it as freedom from a necessity beyond the scope of De Facto Necessity.Now, as you point out, the bible does not directly discuss necessity of this sort. But it teaches it by inference. Never-the-less, one of us has the wrong inference. One of us assumes something illogical or contradictory. Either I incorrectly assume an incoherent or non-existent sense of freedom or you assume an incoherent or non-existent form of necessity regarding our free acts. To one of us, Nehemiah 6:8 applies.Calvinism makes a positive assertion that our actions are necessary with respect to the divine decree.The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iv.iii.xxiv.html The necessity that Calvin is using here isn't De Facto, De Jure or logical. In contrast to De Jure necessity, God's decree impacts what we can do, not an extrinsic aspect of what do. In contrast to De Facto necessity, God's decree does not physically coerce us against our will. In contrast to logical necessity, necessity laid on us by God's decree restricts our action. Calvin is asserting a necessity beyond those you claim comprise the whole of the biblical model. Oh that he wouldn't have said our actions are necessity beyond the biblical sense of necessity!TF: The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.I am not quite sure I see the problem.Dan

I reply:

I'll respond line-by-line:
GIMJ wrote: Your article speaks of three different types of necessity (logical, De Jure & De Facto) none of which restrict us from choosing as we please.

I reply: Exactly. Thus, the Calvinist consistently affirms Biblical free will.

GIMJ wrote: You yourself point out that "Logical Necessity does not - itself - place any attempted restriction on action."

I reply: That is an accurate quotation.

GIMJ wrote: De Jure Necessity does not mean that man cannot commit what is forbidden, but rather he cannot do what is forbidden without guilt.

I reply: That's not true. It does mean that mannot cannot do what is forbidden. See, for example, Genesis 24:50.

Genesis 24:50 Then Laban and Bethuel answered and said, The thing proceedeth from the LORD: we cannot speak unto thee bad or good.

It is an ordinary way of speaking. Of course, you mean "can" in some more narrow, particular way. Nevertheless, within the realm (and using consistent, not equivocal definitions of words) of De Jure necessity we cannot do what is forbidden, and we must do what is commanded.

Your recharacterization of De Jure necessity is troubling for two reasons: (1) the obvious equivocation (using "can" in a non-De Jure sense) and (2) the selection particularly of the Logical Necessity sense of "can" in describing De Jure necessity.

In other words, there are three ways to look at things in De Jure Necessity:

1) Consistent with De Jure Necessity, one cannot steal from one's neighbor, because it is illegal.

2) Equivocating to Logical Necessity, one can steal from one's neighbor, but not without guilt, because stealing is illegal.

3) Equivocating to De Facto Necessity, one can steal from one's neighbor, but not if the police are watching closely, because stealing is illegal.

GIMJ wrote: So De Jure Necessity adds an extrinsic aspect to our actions.

I reply: No, De Jure Necessity does not add extrinsic aspects to our actions. De Jure Necessity is simply defines necessity as it relates to laws, morals, covenants, and the like.

GIMJ wrote: I trust you see that De Jure Necessity is not a limitation in what we can do.

I reply: The Bible says that it is, and common sense agrees. Laws tell you what you can and cannot do. But again, you are using "can" equivocally, not as it is used in De Jure Necessity, but with some other sense in mind.

GIMJ wrote: Man is free from De Facto Necessity (freedom from external force/compulsion).

I reply: As noted in the Necessity post, that is only sometimes the case. Other times we are not free from such necessity. You cannot steal the Mona Lisa because it is too heavily guarded. That's a de facto necessity from which you are not free.

GIMJ wrote: To clarify this is doing something against our will.

I reply: Or, more properly, not to do something that we want to do. See the example above.

GIMJ: The man wants to do X but is forced to do Y.

I reply: Where Y is "notX."

GIMJ wrote: This should not be confused with someone or something external to us is controlling what we want.

I reply: It simply has nothing to do with the issue of what causes us to want what we want.

GIMJ wrote: If we are free in this sense, it as freedom from a necessity beyond the scope of De Facto Necessity.

I reply: I suppose that this is a new definition of freedom/necessity that should be added to my original post, and I will plan to add it. Let's call this LFW-2 for now, and plan to define it as "freedom from someone or something external to us controlling what we want." Presumably LFW-N2 would be "someone or something external to us controlling what we want."

GIMJ wrote: Now, as you point out, the bible does not directly discuss necessity of this sort.

I reply: Actually, this sort of necessity was not addressed in the original article, because it is not called necessity in ordinary speech or the Bible. Nevertheless, the Bible does talk about what controls what we want, at least to some extent. What the Bible does not do, is discuss any sort of freedom along the lines of LFW-2.

GIMJ wrote: But it teaches it by inference.

I reply: Presumably you would hold that it teaches LFW-2, not LFW-N2. And I welcome your attempted Scriptural basis for asserting that teaching.

GMIJ wrote:
Never-the-less, one of us has the wrong inference. One of us assumes something illogical or contradictory. Either I incorrectly assume an incoherent or non-existent sense of freedom or you assume an incoherent or non-existent form of necessity regarding our free acts.

I wrote: I skipped the line-by-line format for once in order to make a comment principally about the final sentence. My position is that LFW-N2 is not necessity properly defined. Instead, it is a philosophical definition of something. Furthermore, I do not have to assume that LFW-N2 exists, I can show that LFW-N2 exists from Scripture, common sense, common experience, and logical deduction. I do not have to assume it or infer it. That's one of the strengths of the Calvinist position over the Arminian position.

GIMJ wrote: To one of us, Nehemiah 6:8 applies.

I reply: Let's first look at the verse in context.

Nehemiah 6:5-8
5Then sent Sanballat his servant unto me in like manner the fifth time with an open letter in his hand; 6Wherein was written, It is reported among the heathen, and Gashmu saith it, that thou and the Jews think to rebel: for which cause thou buildest the wall, that thou mayest be their king, according to these words. 7And thou hast also appointed prophets to preach of thee at Jerusalem, saying, There is a king in Judah: and now shall it be reported to the king according to these words. Come now therefore, and let us take counsel together. 8Then I sent unto him, saying, There are no such things done as thou sayest, but thou feignest them out of thine own heart.

In context, Nehemiah is telling Sanballat that Sanballat is falsely reporting the facts. Disagreement over what Scripture means is not the same or equivalent to fabricating false reports about one's political enemy.

GIMJ wrote: Calvinism makes a positive assertion that our actions are necessary with respect to the divine decree.

I reply: I question whether that it is an accurate characterization of Calvinism. I know that the article to which you were responding does not make that positive assertion. I'm concerned that you are building up a straw man position beginning with the use of the word "necessary" in the line above. My proposal is, for this discussion, for you to allow me to define the Calvinist position, which is more likely to provide an accurate picture, since I am a Calvinist.

GIMJ wrote: The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God.

I reply: This seems to be reference to Romans 9 and/or an attempt to debate the perceived Calvinist position. I will table the discussion of the consequences of the Arminian position until we have clarified what that position is, and whether it is even internally coherent and Scripturally based. Since it does not appear (so far) to be either, I'm not sure we will ever need to get to arguments that are based on assuming it to be correct.

GIMJ wrote: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iv.iii.xxiv.html

I reply: I don't object to GIMJ reading Calvin, but since Calvin is not part of this discussion, there is no reason to suppose that Calvin knows about the definitions we are explaining. Also, Calvin did not write in English, and so additional problems can accrue due to translation. Those things set aside, for the moment:

GIMJ wrote: The necessity that Calvin is using here isn't De Facto, De Jure or logical.

I reply: Calvin is addressing an objection, and it is the objector that uses the term necessity. In fact, Calvin does not rely upon necessity to define his opinion, but concludes:
but since he foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience, while it is clear that all events take place by his sovereign appointment.

Accordingly, it is inaccurate to say that Calvin is "using" some kind of "necessity."

Furthermore, Calvin later states:
I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustine that the will of God is necessity, and that every thing is necessary which he has willed; just as those things will certainly happen which he has foreseen (August. de Gen. ad Lit., Lib. 6, cap. 15).

But again, you have already conceded that those things which He has foreseen will certainly happen, so you cannot object to a definition of necessity that is phrased along the lines that Calvin phrases it above.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to De Jure necessity, God's decree impacts what we can do, not an extrinsic aspect of what do.

I reply: That's very imprecisely worded. Certainly, God's decree of Providence is not a law that binds us morally. It is isntead an ordering of history. To say that it impacts what we can do, is to speak with great imprecision, particularly in view of the various senses that "can" has been given in various contexts. It appears that you are trying to use "can" here in an LFW-N2 sense. However, we have not determined that such a sense of "can" or "necessity" is a proper or Biblical sense of the term.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to De Facto necessity, God's decree does not physically coerce us against our will.

I reply: That's certainly correct.

GIMJ wrote: In contrast to logical necessity, necessity laid on us by God's decree restricts our action.

I reply: This contrast looks like a false dichotomy. That is to say, Calvin appears to be arguing that it is logically necessary that what God has forseen will happen, because of the definition of God. The apparent dichotomy is raised by the equivocal use of "restricts our action." As noted in the previous article, logical necessity does restrict us from doing to two actions in two different places at the same time.

GIMJ wrote: Calvin is asserting a necessity beyond those you claim comprise the whole of the biblical model.

I reply: This is mostly addressed above, where Calvin's own use of the word of necessity is distinguished. Furthermore, it is addressed by providing the "logical necessity" ground for what Calvin was trying to communicate.

GIMJ wrote: Oh that he wouldn't have said our actions are necessity beyond the biblical sense of necessity!

I reply: See above. Expression of angst is not a rebuttal.

GIMJ quoted me as writing:
The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.


GIJ replied: I am not quite sure I see the problem.

I respond: "Man's choices and acts are apparently not free." Is that a problem for you or not?

-Turretinfan

14 comments:

Anonymous said...

Dear Turretinfan,

TF: "Man's choices and acts are apparently not free." Is that a problem for you or not?

With all the semantic differences supposed in what I say, what you are saying, what Calvin is saying and what the Bible is saying I have to ask… Free from what?

Perhaps the answer will help clarify the issue.

Dan

Turretinfan said...

Dear Dan, The answer is: free in the LFW (patched) sense. If the LFW (patched) sense of freedom is not important, we can just set it aside. I notice that you have proposed what appears to be a further sense of freedom (which I've labeled LFW-2 for convenience).
-Turretinfan

Anonymous said...

Dear Turretinfan,

Thee: Man's choices and acts are apparently not free.
Me: Free from what?
Thee: free in the LFW (patched) sense.

Your answer doesn’t directly tell me what we are not free from. Does someone or something necessitate our actions in an LFW-N (or patched LFW-N???) sense?

God be with you,
Dan

Turretinfan said...

Dear Dan,

You wrote: Your answer doesn’t directly tell me what we are not free from. Does someone or something necessitate our actions in an LFW-N (or patched LFW-N???) sense?

I reply: Please understand that I am addressing the logical inconsistency of the non-Calvinist positions.

In the patched form of the LFW, there is no freedom in the sense that such a term is being defined in the LFW (patched) definition.

My analysis shows that to be the case.

It is not that LFW disappears because the act gets necessitated (in whatever relevant sense) but because of the definition of patched LFW.

It's a definitional analysis, not a counterargument.

-Turretinfan

Anonymous said...

Dear Turretinfan,

Me: Does someone or something necessitate our actions in an LFW-N (or patched LFW-N???) sense?

Thee: Please understand that I am addressing the logical inconsistency of the non-Calvinist positions.

In the patched form of the LFW, there is no freedom in the sense that such a term is being defined in the LFW (patched) definition.

My analysis shows that to be the case.

It is not that LFW disappears because the act gets necessitated (in whatever relevant sense) but because of the definition of patched LFW.

It's a definitional analysis, not a counterargument.


I don’t think you answered the question. I sense you may be hesitating to admit that mans actions are necessary in an LFW-N sense. Do you think that would detract from your position?

As for your comment that LFW isn’t disappearing, I would say LFW and LFW-N are mutually exclusive. If something is free, it isn’t necessary and likewise if something is necessary, it’s not free. So by default, if you have demonstrated we don’t have LFW, then our acts are LFW-N.

Dan

Turretinfan said...

Dan:

Do you understand the difference between my presenting my own position and my pointing out the deficiencies in the positions of others?

Surely you do, but your most recent comments seem to indicate that you are not following the presentation.

My comment that you seemed to leap from was: "Man's choices and acts are apparently not free."

This comment was made in an analysis of the use of LFW (patched), which is a non-Calvinist position. The LFW (patched) position is NOT my position, it is one of several non-Calvinist definitions.

Under LFW (patched), i.e. under one set of non-Calvinist definitions, man's choices and acts are apparently not free in the LFW (patched) sense, we'll call that freedom LFW-P-F, in contrast to LFW (patched) necessity, which we'll refer to as LFW-P-N. We'll call LFW (patched), LFW-P.

Note that I am NOT presenting my own position here, I'm analyzing one non-Calvinist position.

With the further definition that: if it is not LFW-P-F then it is LFW-P-N (this further definition provideed in your most recent comment), then the "apparently" disappears from the comment above, and it becomes "Under LFW-P as amended by Dan's most recent comment, man's choices and acts are not LFW-P-F, but LFW-P-N."

In contrast to the LFW-P position, I assert that modern man under the normal, common parlance definitions of necessity and freedom is ordinarily (i.e. normally and usually) free, becuase man ordinarily does what he pleases.

-Turretinfan

Anonymous said...

Dear Turretinfan,

I am not sure what to say. You haven’t answered the question. If you would, I think things would get a bit clearer.

As for your argument:

The patched definition also has another serious problem for the Arminian, and that is that the ability does not coincide with act. That is to say, even if the man has some kind of ability prior to the act, man does not have the ability in the act itself.Thus, if the act we are speaking of is a choice, then under the patched definition, while man may have freedom from LFW-N prior to the choice, in the choice itself man does not have any such freedom. Thus, under this patched definition of LFW, man's freedom disappears at the crucial point, and man's choices and acts are apparently not free.

Let’s see. Let’s assume man is deliberating at T=1 and chooses at T=2. Man is:

1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A
2) Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause
3) Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.

1 & 2 are sufficient for freedom in an LFW-P sense. 3 isn’t an issue, that I can see.

Dan

Turretinfan said...

Dan:

You claim I have not answered the question. I've tried to answer each question you've presented. Which question have I not answered?

-Turretinfan

Turretinfan said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Turretinfan said...

Dan,

You wrote:

Let’s see. Let’s assume man is deliberating at T=1 and chooses at T=2. Man is:

1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A
2) Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause
3) Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.

1 & 2 are sufficient for freedom in an LFW-P sense. 3 isn’t an issue, that I can see.


That's not responsive to the argument I presented.

Here's why.

My argument is:

1) Given ad arguendo the definition of LFW-P,

2) Man has LFW-P-F, but this freedom extends only to acts considered as future, not present.

3) As such, whatever LFW-P-F is, it cannot possibly be a quality of a choice because choices exist in the present.

4) According to you ~if it isn't LFW-P-F it is LFW-P-N~

5) Therefore, choices are LFW-P-N.

That conclusion is probably not acceptable to the Arminian who proposes LFW-P to try to patch LFW.

Your discussion starts to introduce other concepts into the equation, like external sufficient causes or being able to choose WHILE deliberating.

They don't come from the definition of LFW-P, so it would appear that they have been inserted ad hoc.

-Turretinfan

Anonymous said...

Dear Turretinfan,

TF: 2) Man has LFW-P-F, but this freedom extends only to acts considered as future, not present.

3) As such, whatever LFW-P-F is, it cannot possibly be a quality of a choice because choices exist in the present….


It’s worded a bit awkward, but your conclusion is valid. I say it’s awkward, because my points 1 & 2, could easily get confused for 3:

1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A
2) Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause
3) Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.

TF: That conclusion is probably not acceptable to the Arminian who proposes LFW-P to try to patch LFW.

I don’t think so. Accepting 3 as fundamental to freedom would be strange. But perhaps equivocation comes into play. They say man’s choices are free, meaning 1 & 2, but not 3. This seems to be the import of the difference between LFW and LFW-P. I suggest the difference is semantic and not real.

The question I had asked was: Does someone or something necessitate our actions in an LFW-N (or patched LFW-N???) sense?

Dan

Turretinfan said...

Dan:

A) With respect, I don't see the relevance of your points 1-3 to the discussion of LFW-P.

You did not explicitly derive them from the definition of LFW-P, and I'm not sure where they came from.

Before I address their shortcomings (if any), I would like some clarification about their relation to LFW-P etymologically.

Once that relationship is clarified, certain objections I have (and I have concrete objections to 1 and 2) can be presented, if necessary.

B) You don't seem to have a problem with saying that our choices are not free, but I think most Arminians would have a problem with that statement.

Your explanation for why you are comfortable seems to be based on your bottom line claim that "the difference [between LFW and LFW-P] is semantic not real."

LFW and LFW-P define free will differently. If your sense of "free" is in accordance with LFW-P, then your choices are not "free" (i.e. they are not LFW-P-F). Likewise, if your sense of "free" is in accordance with LFW, then you are always subject to LFW-N, because we found that LFW-N reduced to Logical Necessity, which is something everyone is subject to.

Accordingly, under either of those definitions, the result is the same with respect to choices, they are necessary, not free (using the respective definitions of those terms).

That's not really a satisfactory conclusion for you, though, I think. You would like our choices to be "free" in some sense, I think. At least, I think most Arminians would like that.

So, what we do is reject LFW and LFW-P as appropriate starting definitions for free will.

Note that I have partially updated the Inventikos page with a brief discussion of a third form of LFW, which I've designated LFW-2.

Perhaps, however, you'd like to propose either a patched version of one of the existing LFW's or a new definition of LFW that at least avoids the problem that man ends up without free choices.

You asked: Does someone or something necessitate our actions in an LFW-N (or patched LFW-N???) sense?

I reply: I don't think the definitions say explicitly.

If I understand your question correctly, you are asking whether necessity is caused or brought about by a "someone" or "something."

The definition, however, does not really explain what causes the necessity.

I think both Turretin and Arminius would agree that the Logically Necessary is Logically Necessary because of the nature of God.

Thus, at its root, God is the cause of Logical Necessity.

Since we saw that LFW-N boils down to Logical Necessity, then - in that sense - and viewing God as the cause of Logical Necessity, then God is the someone or something.

LFW-P-N is a bit more hazy. We only got to the conclusion that actions are LFW-P-N because of your stipulation that if something is not F it is N. I'm not convinced you were right to make that stipulation within the LFW-P perspective. Nevertheless, if that is part of the definition, then we can again conclude that, in some sense, LFW-P-N boils down to some form of logical necessity, and finds its cause in the nature of God.

But note that I have engaged in a slight evasion above: you have asked not what is the source, reason, or cause for the necessity, but who "necessitated" it, or whether someone "necessitated" the choice.

That question itself opens a can of worms as to what "necessitate" means. Nevertheless, in the sense of identifying what is the source of logical necessity, we must identify God as the source, and perhaps we can bypass some of the quibbling over nomenclature in identifying God as the "something or someone" who is the source of the necessity, without defining "necessitate" explicitly.

-Turretinfan

Anonymous said...

Dear Turretinfan,

You asked for a reconciliation between LFW-P and my three points. That is:

LFW-P “man is able to do either A or not-A prior to the deed”

And

Man is:

1) Able T=1, to choose or not choose A
2) Able at T=2, to stop willing A at T=3, without an external sufficient cause
3) Unable at T=2, to be choosing and not choosing A.


#1 “Man is Able T=1, to choose or not choose A” is essentially LFW-P. I suspect that’s not where you have questions, but if you do please ask them.

#3 is essentially the excluded middle principle you used to drive a wedge between LFW and LFW-P. IE man can’t do the logically impossible.

#2 is the interesting one. I will try to make it boring by rephrasing.

2* man is able at T=2, to stop or continue willing A at T=3.

Now it’s the same as 1 and LFW-P. The only difference is inception verses continuation of a choice. IE let’s say I choose to run a mile. At the ½ mile point, I have to continue in that choice.

I worded #2 differently. I didn’t use alternates (ie stop or continue), but only one object: continuation. Hence I added the qualifier: “without an external sufficient cause”. For our present purposes, please think of a sufficient cause as that which necessitates in an LFW-N sense. So if there is a sufficient cause for A, A is LFW-N. So 2 and 2* have the same import.

That’s a high level matching of points 1-3 and LFW-P.

Thanks for your response to my question. I will get back to you on it.

God be with you,
Dan

Turretinfan said...

Dear Dan:

I respectfully disagree, but I am starting a new post to handle this response.

The link is here:

http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/05/dialogue-with-gimj-re-necessity.html

-Turretinfan